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Poverty, Agency and Resistance in the 
Future of International Law: an 
African perspective 
 
OBIORA CHINEDU OKAFOR 
 
ABSTRACT This article enquires into the likely posture of future international 
law with respect to African peoples. It does so by focusing on three of the 
most important issues that have defined, and are likely to continue to define, 
international law’s engagement with Africans. These are: the grinding poverty 
in which most Africans live, the question of agency in their historical search 
for dignity, and the extent to which these African peoples can effectively resist 
externally imposed frameworks and measures that have negative effects on 
their social, economic and political experience. International law’s future 
posture in these respects is considered through an examination of concrete 
debates relating to agricultural subsidies, debt usury and relief therefrom, and 
the relocation of framework socioeconomic governance of almost every 
African state to external institutions. Insights about what the future holds for 
the effectiveness of Third World resistance are derived from a consideration of 
the broad lessons that can be learned from the successes or failures of some 
past Third World struggles. 
 
 
The theme of this special issue invites contributors to envision, from varying 
perspectives, the likely orientation of future international law’s engagement 
with the Third World.1 In this article I seek to engage this theme from an 
African perspective. My analysis is informed as well by the insights generated 
by critical Third World approaches to international law (TWAIL).2 However, 
without a crystal ball, I can only  attempt, as best as I  can, to read  this 
normative future from the transcripts of past and current diplomatic dramas 
and the narratives of historically continuous existential struggles. Difficult as 
this task is, the historical continuities and discontinuities that meet the 
 
trained (TWAIL) eye provide an elevated platform from which to gaze into the 
horizon, and to make out, in outline, a picture of what seems to lie in store 
for most African peoples in the future of international law. 
The three main questions that are dealt with in this article all relate to the 
extent to which future international law can reasonably be expected to 
promote much more effectively the well-being of African peoples. The first 
such question is the extent to which future international law can be 
reasonably expected to curtail its significant role in the generation and 
maintenance of conditions of poverty on the African continent. Second, to 
what extent is this future normative order likely to permit and/or promote 
the exercise of much more local agency in the governance of African 
societies? Third, to what extent is this future order likely to allow African 
peoples the spaces from which they can resist much more effectively the 
various aspects of our global circumstance that most of them perceive as 
unfair to them? 
Three of the concepts that feature prominently in the questions articulated 
above require some explanation, or at least a measure of location. These 
concepts are: poverty, agency and resistance. Let me begin by explaining 
briefly what I mean by the term poverty. While one of the World Bank’s key 
short hands for measuring poverty—living on less than one dollar a day—is 
now widely accepted and used as a key measure of that condition around the 
world,3 as I use the term poverty in this article it is meant to include any 
incidence of the fundamental deprivation, or the serious lack, of basic needs 
 
(such as food, water, shelter, education, clothing and essential medicines). 
This understanding of poverty does not of course conflict with the World 
Bank’s overall approach to poverty reduction.4 Yet, without enacting what 
Baxi has called ‘a hierarchy of pain and suffering’, the understanding of 
poverty that is suggested here largely avoids the under-inclusion of significant 
forms of grinding poverty that may not be captured by the day ‘dollar-a-day’ 
measure. It also eschews the over-inclusion of some whose suffering pales in 
comparison with the kind of suffering that is intended to be addressed by the 
term ‘poverty’.5 
As used in this article, the term agency ‘refers not to the intentions 
people have in doing things but to their capability of doing those things in 
the first place’.6 In articulating this understanding of agency, I am obviously 
indebted to Anthony  Giddens’ much-referenced  work on ‘structuration’.7 
Thus, as Seckinelgin has correctly noted, the  concept  of  agency  is 
fruitfully understood as the capability to deal with an issue, question or 
problem.8 
For both Richard Falk and Balakrishnan Rajagopal, it is to a 
combination of state action and social movement protests (not one or the 
other) that one must turn to understand the meaning of resistance in the 
international legal order.9 It is this approach that has shaped my 
understanding and use of the term here as encompassing both resistance 
by African states and social movement action within and across state 
 
boundaries. That approach has also shaped my conception of the nature of 
the targets to which such resistance ought to be directed (in appropriate 
cases) as inclusive, not just of powerful states but also of certain non-state 
global actors like the key international financial institutions (IFIs) and many 
transnational corporations (TNCs). My treatment of resistance in this article 
has also been heavily influenced by Upendra Baxi’s seminal work on social 
movements and human rights, especially the distinctions he draws between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ social movements.10 
 
The focus in this article on poverty, agency and resistance is justified by 
the salience and significance of all three concepts in the historical struggles 
of most African peoples for human dignity. First, it is now almost trite to 
say that the reduction of poverty on the African continent is key to the 
success of their overall struggle for dignity.11 Yet it bears emphasis here to 
note that even today ‘40% of all Africans survive on less than a dollar a 
day’ and far more than that number eke out a living in an atmosphere of 
grinding material deprivation.12 The distributive dimension of this incidence 
of poverty in most African states is increasingly acknowledged by 
important decision makers. For example, the Nigerian government’s 
National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) clearly 
states that ‘income inequality in Nigeria is very high’.13  Similarly, the 
World Bank has recently shown that widespread and deep inequity in 
Africa and the rest of the Third World is a key reason for the continued 
 
prevalence of poverty in those areas of the world.14 And the EU is 
convinced that, ‘while several African countries have managed to record 
impressive economic growth’, the ‘highly unequal distribution of income [in 
most African countries] often prevents this growth from having a positive 
impact on poverty levels’.15 Second, the importance of the question of 
agency in Africa’s historical search for dignity is evident in the EU’s recent 
acknowledgement that ‘development policies and strategies cannot be 
imposed from the outside’ and that ‘the EU should consistently and 
collectively support Africa and country-owned strategies and policies’.16 
What is left unsaid by the EU is that, at least for now, this approach to 
African agency is manifested more at the level of rhetoric and desire, and 
less at the level of practice. The much-discussed history of the imple- 
mentation of structural adjustment  strategies  and  other such  policies in 
Africa bears eloquent testimony to the veracity of this claim.17 Third, given 
the prevalence of imposed governance policies in Africa, it is hardly 
controversial to claim that the capacity of African peoples to resist these 
impositions and rewrite the relevant global rules will in itself be a highly 
important factor in the success or failure of each of their struggles for 
dignity.18 
The rest of the article is divided into four parts. The first three sections will 
deal with the questions articulated in the foregoing paragraphs, while the last, 
concluding, section will provide an overall assessment of future international 
 
law’s likely posture(s) with regard to the need to radically reduce poverty in 
most African societies, to recognise and promote local agency in almost all 
these places, and to permit and more meaningfully internalise African 
resistance to non-favourable global rules. 
 
On poverty 
Any credible consideration of the likely extent of future international law’s 
commitment to the significant reduction of poverty on the African continent 
must begin from a serious analysis of the existing evidence in this regard. It 
must therefore proceed from the recognition of the historical reluctance of 
the international legal order to promote actively the socioeconomic well- 
being of most Africans. As the late Ivan Head once noted: 
 
That international law can, indeed should, contribute to development, is not in 
question, but it must be remembered that some of the applications of legal 
principles, designed as they often were in the industrialised countries, are not 
always in the interest of developing countries.19 
 
If, as Ivan Head has shown us, international law has been traditionally 
insensitive to the cause of poverty reduction (a key objective of development), 
how likely is it that future international law will become more sensitive in this 
respect? Will this future normative order be able to contribute more 
 
effectively to the urgent need to grow real incomes and radically increase 
access to other socioeconomic benefits on the African continent? In a similar 
vein will it be able to contribute to the imperative of enthroning far more 
socioeconomic equity within African states? Two lines of inquiry are 
suggested by the above questions: the first one relates to future international 
law’s probable relevance or irrelevance to the struggle for increased real 
incomes and other socioeconomic benefits in Africa. The other concerns that 
future order’s likely attitude to the search for much greater socioeconomic 
equity within African states. While the investigation of both of these 
questions is important in order to fully appreciate the likely nature of future 
international law’s relationship to the struggle to reduce poverty on the 
continent, space does not allow the consideration of both questions here. 
Thus only the first sub-question will be examined. 
That sub-question will be considered by engaging in a relatively general 
discussion of the question of the possible elimination of the trade-distorting 
agricultural subsidies that many of the far richer countries of the North have 
for decades maintained in the global trading system, while ensuring that most 
African countries effectively open up most of their own markets to imports 
from these far richer countries.20 This is an issue that is governed by the 
World Trade Organization’s (WTO) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).21 Given the fact that a sizeable majority of African people live in rural 
areas and depend for their subsistence on agriculture,22 and considering that a 
 
very large number of African countries are as reliant for their national incomes 
on the export of their agricultural produce to markets in the geopolitical 
North,23 any factor that negatively affects  the  volume and prices of these 
exports to the North poses a highly significant obstacle to the struggle to 
substantially increase the incomes of African peoples and to thereby reduce the 
incidence of poverty on the African continent. As such, the relative failure, at 
least to date, of international (trade) law to deal effectively with these trade- 
distorting agricultural subsidies has made an important negative contribution 
to the continuing poverty of far too many Africans.24 The extent of this 
agricultural subsidy has been estimated at $300 billion (a massive figure that 
basically equals the total economic output from all of Africa).25 Yet these 
subsidies have survived in large measure despite the fact that almost all of 
the farms in the North that benefit from such subsidies are really marginal to 
the economic output and prosperity of the relevant countries (largely the EU, 
the USA and Japan).26 By contrast, as has  been argued above, agriculture 
remains central to the economic survival of most African peoples. 
It is of course important to realise that the maintenance of a national 
agricultural productive capacity is as sensitive an issue in the First World as it 
is in Africa. Many Northern countries have expressed the fear that following 
an anti-subsidy path might lead to the devastation of their agricultural 
sectors. As such there is a political cost involved for the relevant countries of 
the North should they support the implementation of international trade 
 
rules that require the elimination of subsidies. However, apart from the fact 
that the removal of the relevant subsidies will not necessarily lead to the 
devastation of every kind of agricultural endeavour in these countries, given 
the overall scheme of international trade, these countries of the North cannot 
continue to maintain these kinds of subsidy while ensuring that the far 
weaker African countries open their own markets and remove subsidies in 
areas that are as, or even more, sensitive to their economies. 
While the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) for 2006 under the aegis of 
the WTO signals the growing sensitivity of international (trade) law in this 
important area,27 it is hardly clear from any of the discussions on the 
reduction of these agricultural subsidies that it will, in the near or medium- 
term future lead to their total elimination, or to a significant upsurge in the 
exportation of agricultural produce from the relevant parts of Africa to the 
countries of the North. What is more, even the partial changes that have been 
proposed have taken so long to negotiate and congeal, much less to 
implement, that a measure of pessimism only seems realistic. This less-than- 
optimistic reading of international law’s likely future posture in this respect is 
reinforced by the informed realisation that the snail’s pace at which the 
negotiations and implementation of the relevant agreements have so far 
proceeded essentially reflects, and bows to, the huge South – North power 
asymmetries of the global order. Had the relevant subsidies been handed out 
by the much weaker Third World countries, and had the North found itself 
demanding more market access via the elimination of these subsidies, it is 
 
highly unlikely that the negotiation and implementation of a remedial 
agreement would have taken so long. Nevertheless, it is still a commendable 
development that the negotiations have made some headway at all, however 
minor or modest its progress thus far. 
Thus, as much as these developments indicate the possibility of change in 
the orientation of future international law’s engagement with African 
peoples, what is most evident from these developments is the law’s historical 
tendency to reflect and respond more effectively to the economic worries and 
demands of the North, and to be at the same time much less responsive to the 
socioeconomic challenges facing most African peoples. Since the rapid 
reduction of the agricultural subsidies discussed above would lead to 
reasonably increased incomes for a great many African farmers and their 
states, the likelihood that future international law will contribute much more 
effectively to the urgent need to grow incomes and increase access to other 
socioeconomic benefits on the African continent is called into question by the 
evident reluctance of the much more powerful countries of the North to 
eliminate these subsidies. While other factors will of course help determine 
any increases in the real income of African peoples, this allegorical story 
(about international law’s relative insensitivity to the necessity for the 
elimination of the Northern practice of offering extensive financial subsidies 
to their farmers, and about the ways in which that behaviour helps maintain 
the poverty that is rife in many African states) is highly instructive. The 
continuity of this sort of trend over almost all of modern history and the snail 
 
speed of current international legal reform in the area does not inspire much 
confidence in the likelihood that future international law will contribute 
effectively to the reduction of poverty on the African continent. 
As discussed, there is little in reality that suggests that the more powerful 
states will in the near or medium-term future be willing to make the kinds of 
fundamental economic concessions to African states in areas such as the 
elimination of agricultural subsidies without extracting from these African 
countries certain countervailing concessions (which will tend to detract from 
the gains of the anticipated cuts in these Northern subsidies). History teaches 
us that the  more economically powerful states, indeed almost all states, 
hardly ever give up their more powerful positions in a willing fashion. As 
such, barring any sudden seismic shifts in the configuration of global power, 
or in the receptiveness of the public and/or ruling elites in the more powerful 
states of the North to more far-reaching pro-global equity ideas, these more 
powerful states are likely to continue to act in ways that essentially preserve 
rather than reform the economic status quo. This is not to say that these 
states will not make any concessions whatsoever to African states. They will 
certainly make many such concessions over the near and medium-term future 
of international law. What one is much less sanguine about is the 
preparedness and ability of any of these states of the North to make the 
kind of radical concessions that would fundamentally threaten the privileged 
socioeconomic positions of almost all of their citizenry vis-à -vis the vast 
majority of African peoples. 
 
On agency 
To what extent is future international law likely to permit or promote the 
exercise of more African agency in the governance of African societies, while 
restricting to a minimum the current overbearing role of outsiders in the 
constitution of these societies? If, as Giddens has shown, the term agency is 
best understood as the capability of doing things, this question can also be 
framed in terms of the extent to which future international law is likely to 
permit or promote the capability of African peoples to chart their own 
futures and to self-constitute.28 
Here again, a credible inquiry into this question must begin with an attempt 
to understand the historical tendencies of international law in this connection. 
Are there historical continuities that meet the eye in this respect? And what 
kinds of discontinuities, if any, can be observed? As Antony Anghie’s work 
has shown, despite the discontinuities that exist in the exact forms and 
techniques that were deployed, there is indeed a historical continuity from at 
least the 16th century onward in international law’s tolerance of, if not active 
support for, the negation and/or erasure of Third World (including of course 
African) agency.29 At root this denial of African agency has taken the form, in 
each era of global interrelations, of an assault on the capacity of African 
peoples to govern their own lives and chart their own futures. In the mid-19th 
to the mid-20th century, this negation of African agency was more formal, 
extensive and suffocating than it currently is.30 This was the era of formal 
 
European colonial rule over Africa, in which nearly every aspect of the life of 
almost every African society became marked to some extent by a coercively 
(and often brutally) superimposed colonial order.31 Quite obviously, that 
specific era of formal colonial rule over Africa has now ended. 
However, it is instructive that up to this day the term imposition (or its 
synonyms) remains the key word when discerning African leaders and 
scholars describe the African continent’s relationship to international 
institutions or to the North. For example, as Nigerian President Olusegun 
Obasanjo, a key African leader, has recently noted: 
 
when we [Africans] thought we had regained control of our destiny, and when 
we believed that we had earned our rights to join the rest of the world as equal 
partners and discuss mutual co-operation on basis of equitability, we 
discovered that the position of our continent in the world order had been 
disadvantageously fixed and predetermined by numerous factors which, for want 
of a better description, we call colonial legacies.32 
 
As remarkably, a diverse group of African scholars such as Michael Chege, 
George Ayittey and Joe Oloka-Onyango have over the past decade or so 
expressed similar views about the status of African states and peoples as less 
than full actors/partners on the global plane, and have bemoaned the entailed 
denial of  African agency to a highly significant  degree. While Chege has 
long dreamed of the day when African societies might ‘graduate from 
 
being passive recipients of charity to full actors in global politics and 
economics’,33 Ayittey has more recently chided the World Bank for not 
taking more steps to ‘identify and support the initiative of Africans’.34 For 
his own part, Oloka-Onyango is convinced that ‘for many [African and 
other] developing countries IMF prescriptions are in fact edicts giving the 
latter little choice and almost no room to maneouvre’.35 What is more, even 
the recent EU Strategy for Africa bemoans the tendency for powerful 
outsiders to negate and over-circumscribe African agency. That document 
declares quite clearly (and thus commendably) that ‘development policies and 
strategies cannot be imposed [on African societies] from the outside’.36 
In terms of predicting the orientation of future international law in this 
respect, at a minimum there is as yet insufficient cause for near or medium- 
term optimism. As BS Chimni has shown, if much care is not taken, the 
ongoing, less formal, less extensive and less suffocating processes via which 
international law and institutions (usually dominated by the more powerful 
countries of the North) impose upon,  or at least exert strong  compliance 
pressure on, African and other Third World states, risks being transformed 
into a more formal, more extensive, and more suffocating global regime that is 
akin in many important respects to the systems of colonial rule that severely 
constricted African agency in the 19th and 20th centuries.37 As he has put it: 
 
A network of economic, social and political IIs [international institutions] has 
 
been established or repositioned, at the initiative of the first world, and together 
they constitute a nascent global state whose function is to realize the interests of 
transnational capital and powerful states in the international system to the 
disadvantage of third world states and peoples. The evolving global state 
formation may therefore be described as having an imperial character.38 
 
In my own view this assessment of the direction in which the international 
legal order is moving and is likely to continue to move receives much support 
from the example of the way in which the framework economic governance of 
African peoples and of the vast majority of the other Third World countries 
has been all but seized by certain IFIs, institutions that are clearly and 
extensively dominated by a small number of the most powerful countries of 
the North. As I argued not too long ago, it is now clear to most critical 
observers that the framework governance of African societies has now been 
effectively relocated to IFIs and certain key countries of the North.39 It has, in 
other words, been externalised.40 As economically weak as almost all of them 
are, African countries which want and need to maintain their credit- 
worthiness—a minimum requirement for participation in the international 
economy—must come to terms with a largely predetermined set of policies 
imposed upon them by a loose but cohesive consortium made up of the IMF, 
World Bank and key G8 countries (and their banks).41 In almost all cases, 
these African countries are required to remove social subsidies, privatise key 
industries and retrench significant proportions of their public employees.42 
 
Regardless of one’s view about the reasonableness or otherwise of these 
policies, the point that is being made here is that, despite the usual 
declarations about these policies being ‘home grown’, they have in almost 
every case been imposed by this IMF-led consortium.43 
This fact of the existence of a figurative noose around the necks of most 
African policy makers and the denial of African agency in the formulation of 
broad economic policies for their societies is not negated by evidence of the 
existence of inevitably minor African input into the constitution of the 
domestic versions of these policies. The fact that framework economic 
documents like those outlining the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) and the Nigerian NEEDS seem, on the surface, to have 
been conceived by African leaders themselves, does not at all disprove the 
argument being made here. For example, upon closer examination, the 
NEPAD document reflects many of the same neoliberal economic assumptions 
and tenets that are favoured by the IFIs. As James Gathii has correctly noted, 
NEPAD adopts the same kinds of market-based development strategies that 
are highly recommended by the IMF to African countries.44 Except for the 
fact  that  NEPAD  makes  a  little  more  provision  for  the  accommodation of 
some of the anticipated ‘losers’ in the implementation of the IMF-style 
economic reforms it endorses, the NEPAD document could easily have been 
written in an early to mid-1990s, or even in a contemporary, IMF or World 
Bank office in Washington.45 It is no wonder then that the IMF has endorsed 
 
NEPAD   quite  effusively.46 
Similarly, the NEEDS document reproduces every central tenet of the IMF’s 
and World Bank’s requirements for certifying a country to its creditors as 
being engaged in meaningful reform. Indeed, as Sam Amadi has noted, ‘a 
critical reading of the entire [NEEDS] document shows that it still keeps faith 
with the broad framework of neo-liberal market-oriented reform which the 
World  Bank  and  the  International  Monetary  Fund  strongly  endorse’.47 
Another reason for concluding that the NEEDS document is largely a product 
of substantial IFI  pressure on the Nigerian government is the precipitate 
endorsement of NEEDS by the IMF and the World Bank.48  What is more, the 
continued endorsement by the IMF and the World Bank of the NEEDS-driven 
civil service retrenchment or ‘right-sizing’, and of the massive fuel price 
increases that have been implemented in Nigeria, reflects the conformity of 
this  overall  economic  governance  framework  with  the  IMF’s  and  World 
Bank’s own policy prescriptions for Nigeria.49  Similarly, while noting some 
of  the  difficulties  associated  with  its  implementation,  the  IMF   has  still 
described the current government’s overall economic reform programme 
as ‘commendable’.50  It also described the retrenchment of 17 000 workers 
resulting from the implementation of this same economic ‘restructuring’ 
agenda   as   ‘progress’.51    All   these   comments   point   to   the   IMF’s   over- 
all satisfaction with Nigeria’s implementation of the same kind of broad 
economic reform agenda that it has routinely insisted the country adopt. It is 
 
therefore   only   reasonable   to   conclude   from   this   examination   of   the 
authorship of both NEPAD and NEEDS that, in most cases, even the presumed 
African authors of these supposedly ‘home grown’ documents have, at the 
very least, been constrained by the pressure exerted over most African states 
by the key IFIs. It can therefore be reasonably argued that these documents 
also exemplify the substantial, if partial, erasure of the agency of Africans in 
their own framework governance. If such key economic policy frameworks 
have, in essence, been largely formulated by IFIs and the countries of the 
North that dominate these institutions, thereby effectively removing key 
decisions from the realm of local decision making, is there still a possibility 
for engagement in meaningful popular politics at the domestic level? Is it still 
possible for African peoples to chart their own futures and to self-constitute; 
at least to the extent that is possible in the more powerful states of the North? 
There is little reason, if any, to believe that the answers to these questions 
will be positive in the near or medium-term future. There is also little reason 
to suppose that the countries of the North that currently dominate our global 
order will willingly concede to Africans the level of agency that they desire. 
Indeed, it would seem that Africans will be lucky to retain even the low levels 
of agency that they are now allowed under the current international legal 
order. Thus, unless a critical mass of African societies is able to acquire 
substantially  more  global  socioeconomic  and  political  power  and/or  to 
become better able to resist those aspects of our current and future global 
circumstance which tend to disadvantage African peoples, the African 
 
continent of the future will, under the watchful eyes of international law, 
remain in its historically subordinated global position. 
 
On resistance 
If the resistance of African societies to certain aspects of the international 
legal order will be central to Africa’s escape in the near and medium-term 
future from the clutches of gross poverty and disadvantage, then the extent to 
which that future order is likely to be transformed by such resistance matters 
much. So do the forms that such resistance must take if it is to be effective. As 
noted in the introduction to this article, the concept of resistance that is 
deployed here  draws on the  separate  writings of Richard Falk and 
Balakrishnan Rajagopal. As such, the extant discussion focuses not merely 
on the dissent expressed by African leaders with respect to the nature of the 
international legal order, but also on the resistance mounted by African 
peoples, especially as manifested in the efforts of those social movements that 
engage in pro-African struggles on the international plane. 
An assessment of the extent to which future international law is likely to 
allow the necessary room for African resistance to its more pernicious aspects 
can be either more or less optimistic. For instance, at the less optimistic end 
of the spectrum Joel Ngugi has argued that international law is so 
problematic for the struggle of African and other Third World peoples that 
it cannot be reformed from the inside.52 To Ngugi the entire episteme that 
 
grounds international law is so heavily biased in favour of a Eurocentric 
world-view that it ought to be abandoned by African and other Third World 
peoples.53 In his view third world peoples ought to ‘build an alternative 
oppositional template from which to address the problem of domination in 
international law’.54 However, scholars such as Makau Mutua and BS 
Chimni are somewhat more optimistic. As critical as he is of the anti-African 
bias of much of international law, Mutua’s work is nevertheless characterised 
by a certain faith in the possibility, under certain circumstances, of 
meaningful, even if not entirely satisfactory, reform, however remote this 
possibility.55 For his own part, while not naı̈  ve about the inherent 
limitations of this  approach,  Chimni  is  as  convinced  of  the  possibility   
of internal international legal reconstruction, and even chides Third World 
scholars for not doing more towards the formulation of alternative  
international law futures.56 
Ngugi’s relative pessimism about the possibility of fundamental pro- 
African reform within the international legal order as it is currently 
constituted is quite understandable given the historical failure of most Third 
World attempts at the deep transformation of the global order. For example, 
the attempt in the 1960s and 1970s by African and other Third World states 
to promote what they referred to as a ‘New International Economic Order’ 
was, for the most part, defeated by the inflexibility on this question of most of 
the more powerful Northern states.57 And, as has already been shown in this 
 
article, current attempts by a transnational coalition to secure meaningful 
debt relief and the elimination of trade-distorting agricultural subsidies have 
also not met with the level of success that African peoples desire. 
Yet there is also countervailing evidence of the possibility, under certain 
conditions, of African and Third World success in pushing through a 
measure of reform. Even the two African and Third World campaigns for the 
elimination of agricultural subsidies and in favour of debt relief that are 
mentioned above have met with some success. Thus not all the attempts by 
African and other Third World peoples to reform  or transform the 
international legal order can be said to have failed in large measure. For 
example, it is hard to argue that the struggle to rid the African continent of 
the scourge of formal and direct colonisation has not met with meaningful, 
even if not complete, success.58 Despite the continuing existence of indirect 
forms of external control over Africa, few if any existing global regimes equal 
the direct and suffocating brutality of the formal colonialism that African 
peoples have now mostly escaped. Second, the epic (African-led) campaign to 
reform the relevant world trade rules so as to allow Third World peoples far 
more access to much cheaper essential (especially HIV/AIDS) medications has 
definitely not failed.59 Despite continuing squabbles over the legal character 
of the Doha Declaration, which records the concessions won by African and 
other Third World states in this connection, it is now a widely established 
principle that the relevant global patent protection rules can and ought to be 
broken in order to provide ready access to cheap life-saving essential drugs to 
 
the poorer peoples of the world; a large percentage of whom live on the 
African  continent.60 
In the two examples above the pressure exerted by a coalition of actors that 
included African leaders, African social movements and/or transnational 
social movements, was central to the substantial, albeit still limited, success 
enjoyed in pushing through a pro-African agenda on the global socio-legal 
stage. In the first case, that is the anti-colonial movement, such pressure was 
largely exerted by an African mass social movement that included both 
African leaders and peoples. In the second example, pressure originated from 
a (sometimes virtual and at times actual) transnational coalition that was 
composed of African leaders and activists, as well as progressive forces in the 
North.61 As limited as their success has tended to be, almost all of the other 
modestly fruitful struggles to alter the nature of the contemporary 
international legal order that have benefited Africans and other Third World 
peoples have been led or highly supported by coalitions of Third World social 
movements, progressive Northern forces and Third World and other 
sympathetic political leaders.62 As Rajagopal has correctly noted, from the 
successful conclusion of the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Land- 
mines, through the creation of the World Bank Inspection Panels, to the 
establishment of the World Commission on Dams, concerted Third World 
and Northern social movement alliances and action have helped drive some 
notable state-sanctioned changes at the global level.63 
 
It seems therefore that the efforts of African and other Third World forces 
at resisting and rewriting aspects of international law that they view with 
disfavour have met with meaningful success when those struggles have 
involved a coalition of African and other Third World leaders and pro- 
African social movements.64 Another key feature of these more successful 
struggles for greater African dignity at the global level has been the 
deployment of the added power created when the movement takes on a 
transnational character.65 If these two observations are as correct as I think 
they are, then they are suggestive of the kinds of strategies that might work in 
the future for those African peoples who are concerned to resist successfully 
the aspects of future international law that negatively affect them. Without at 
all diminishing the continuing relevance of the African state as a global-level 
vehicle for expressing the dissent of African peoples, it seems that a 
transnationally focused and social movement-sensitive strategy is imperative if 
African peoples are more effectively to  resist their subordination in the 
international legal order of the near or medium-term future.66 This 
imperative is reinforced by existing, if cutting-edge, currents in international 
relations. As Rajagopal has shown, well organised social movements in 
Africa and the rest of the Third World have at times formed moderately 
effective alliances with sympathetic Northern forces that have sometimes 
produced a meaningful measure of desired change in the global order.67 
Thus, inasmuch as future international law is not likely to allow much 
 
room for African leaders and peoples to foster fundamental change in the 
global order of the time, the more effective the strategies deployed by African 
peoples, the more appreciable the level of transformation that they can 
initiate. And, as has been argued in this section, the more the strategies of 
resistance or dissent adopted by Africans resemble the kinds of transnational 
social movement strategies that seem to have increased their chances of 
success in the past, the more they will be able to shape the character of future 
international law. 
Despite my recommendation of the use of a combination of both state- 
based and social movement-style strategies as a way of enhancing the chances 
of African activism to effect change in the global order,  let me  end this 
section by sounding two notes of caution. First of all, I am of course aware 
that, as Joel Ngugi has argued, as long the resistance launched by Third 
World peoples has not been viewed as likely to lead to the fundamental 
reorganisation of the world order, international law has historically been 
quite happy to ‘donate the power of dissent’ to African and other Third 
World peoples while continuing to bequeath to the North the ‘prescription 
of solutions to world problems’.68 Nevertheless, given the historical 
experience of African peoples of colonial subjugation in the 18th and 19th 
centuries and continuing marginally to this day, their very ability to exercise 
the power of dissent/resistance is in and of itself an act of liberation. What is 
more, as already pointed out, sufficient evidence already exists to warrant a 
highly cautious, but nevertheless more optimistic, assessment of the 
 
contingent possibility of securing certain modest concessions that can 
markedly improve the lot of a large percentage of Africans in short order. 
Most African peoples simply do not have the luxury of waiting interminably, 
it seems, for the day that they can effectively de-couple themselves from the 
international legal order. And, as I have already argued, the possibility that 
their resistance will bear some fruit is brightened appreciably when 
transnationally focused and social movement-sensitive strategies are 
deployed by African leaders and peoples. This is not to say, of course, that 
the power of dissent conceded to African peoples by international law is not a 
significantly limited one. It is acknowledged that on its own the exercise of 
this power of dissent is unlikely to lead to the fundamental transformation of 
the world order. Though subject to change, the countervailing power 
asymmetries are simply too great at present. 
Second, I am also aware of, and agree with, Upendra Baxi’s cautionary 
tale regarding the Janus-faced quality of the social movement ‘shell’. Like 
any other shell, this particular kind of shell can of course be filled with either 
‘good’ desire or ‘bad’ intent.69 For instance, as Baxi argues, proponents of 
hate speech or women’s subordination can create and have sometimes 
created and fostered their own social movements.70 These are not movements 
likely to advantage Third World peoples.  As such, wearing a social 
movement garb, or even taking on a social movement character, will not 
on its own ensure that a particular reformist or transformative coalition (of 
the kind recommended here) will promote positions that advantage Third 
 
World peoples. Having said that, the point being made in this section is that, 
in order to experience significantly greater success, ‘good’ Third World 
international law reform or transformation projects will, it seems, need to 
work both transnationally and in a social movement mode. The fact that 
‘bad’ social movements can also deploy this strategy should not on its own 
deter these ‘good’ movements from adopting this otherwise ethical strategy 
that significantly increases their chances of success. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is useful to provide an overall assessment of the vision of the 
broad position that most African peoples are likely to occupy in the 
international legal order of the near and medium-term future presented in 
this article. This less than clairvoyant reading of that future order’s likely 
overall posture is mediated by the prism of that order’s existing historical 
record with regard to its stance on the radical reduction of poverty in Africa, 
on the markedly increased promotion of local agency on the continent, and 
on the African resistance to some of its dictates. 
Seen through these prisms, international law is unlikely to undergo any 
really far-reaching or fundamental transformation. It is unlikely to be 
transformed in the near or medium-term future into a normative order that 
serves African people much more effectively. Future international law is 
unlikely to be altered so as to as foster the kind of much more equitable 
 
world economic order that is envisaged by the campaigns of African (and 
other Third World) peoples for the elimination of the agricultural subsidies 
that key countries in the North provide to many of their farmers. Similarly, 
future international law is unlikely to function in a way that greatly enhances 
the self-constitution of African societies. As long as it remains relatively silent 
about or even tends to promote the denial of African agency in the 
governance of Africa’s own societies, that order will for the most part remain 
insensitive to the yearnings of African peoples to exercise more control over 
their own lives than in past and current global orders. 
What is more, without more of a focus on deploying the kinds of 
transnational social movement strategies that have increased their chances of 
success in the past, African leaders and peoples (like most of their like- 
minded cohort in the rest of the Third World) are unlikely to improve upon 
their historically suboptimal record in significantly affecting the play of 
global politics in ways that will impact much more effectively on the lives 
of most of the continent’s peoples. Yet even the adoption of this kind of 
innovative strategy is unlikely to win for Africans the kind of fundamental 
concessions from the far more powerful states of the North that are necessary 
for Africa and our entire global circumstance to experience speedy and 
sustainable change. Thus, absent that near or medium-term possibility, and 
barring any sudden deep structural changes in current ideational, economic, 
political and social power asymmetries in the global order, change will 
continue to be administered on Africa (and not really by Africans). And such 
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